Year: 2014
Type: article
Abstract: While philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, I argue that more attention should be paid to the circumstances and aims of their experimental production in the science of perception. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether they illuminate something about the nature of perception. I illustrate this point with a historical debate between Gestalt psychologists and atomists, both of whom used first-person methods to investigate perception, but who disagreed deeply over the epistemic value of their respective first-person data.
Source: Philosophy of Science
DOI: 10.1086/677689
Author: Uljana Feest
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2106977041
