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Incentive Schemes, Private Information and the Double-Edged Role of Competition for Agents

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Year: 2013
Type: preprint
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2196027
Authors: Christina E. Bannier, Eberhard Feess, Natalie Packham, Markus Walzl
Institutions: Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Universität Innsbruck
Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications
Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: incentive contracts, moral hazard, private information, vertical differentiation, horizontal differentiation, risk-averse agents, contract design, overbidding, separating equilibrium, existence of equilibrium, horizontal competition
SDG: Decent work and economic growth

Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2127621608
Cites: 49
Cited by: 4
Related to: 10
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