Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: We consider Rubinstein’s two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns about the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent with stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party’s relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.
Source: Games
DOI: 10.3390/g4030329
Authors: Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
Institutions: UCLouvain Saint-Louis Brussels, UCLouvain
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $1,930
Award: G824757398
OpenAlex ID: W2129129507
