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Credulity, lies, and costly talk
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Year:
2006
Type:
article
Source:
Journal of Economic Theory
DOI:
10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.003
Authors:
Navin Kartik,
Marco Ottaviani,
Francesco Squintani
Institutions:
University of California San Diego,
Columbia University,
London Business School,
Bocconi University,
University College London
Language:
English
Topic:
Game Theory and Applications
Subfield:
Management Science and Operations Research
Field:
Decision Sciences
Domain:
Social Sciences
Keywords:
strategic communication,
credulity,
upward bias,
separating equilibrium,
deception,
unbounded state space
show all 6
Open Access status:
closed
OpenAlex ID:
W2139484858
FWCI:
11.36
Cites:
33
Cited by:
482
Related to:
10