Year: 2000
Type: book
Abstract: Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to make iterative auctions that compute optimal allocations with myopic best-response bidding strategies more robust to manipulation. First, introduce proxy bidding agents to con-strain bidding strategies to (possibly untruthful) myopic best-response. Second, after the auction terminates adjust the prices towards those given in the Vickrey auction, a sealed-bid auction in which truth-revelation is optimal. We present an application of this methodology to iBundle, an iterative combinatorial auction which gives optimal allocations for myopic best-response agents.
Authors: David C. Parkes, Lyle Ungar
Institution: University of Pennsylvania
Language: English
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: National Science Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W2157345142