Promiscuous Politicians and the Problem of Party Building
Year: 2014
Type: preprint
Abstract: Political brokers are essential to clientelistic parties, but they may be unreliable. Through their own local ties, brokers make sure parties receive voters' support. However, in party systems with competing clientelistic parties, these connections are valuable to other parties, and brokers are likely to defect when presented a more lucrative proposition. When brokers switch, parties' local linkages erode. This article analyzes how limiting party switching help parties maintain continued local support. It examines the case of Brazil, where until recently brokers -- who also serve as local candidates -- frequently changed allegiances. However, a largely unexpected institutional reform discouraged brokers who had won local elections from switching. Using regression discontinuities designs I show that compared to their losing counterparts, winning candidates became more dependable party intermediaries only after the ruling. Further, I identify that the exogenously set exit barriers improved prospects for these parties unable to enforce loyalty on their own.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Author: Lucas M. Novaes
Institution: Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2206703595