Year: 2010
Type: article
Abstract: This dissertation seeks to explain why international investment agreements, despite being created with the same purposes and functions in mind, often display important variation in their degree of legalization.I posit that such variation exists because legalization creates a trade-off -between making credible commitments to foreign investors and retaining autonomous control over investment policies -that governments choose to resolve differently.Therefore, to explain the legalization of investment agreements, I develop a theory which explains how governments resolve the credibility-autonomy trade-off, leading them to conclude agreements with varying levels of legalization.My core argument is that governments' willingness to submit to extensive constraints on their policy autonomy is shaped powerfully by their time horizons.Governments with long time horizons prize having greater autonomy to modify policies that shape the effect that foreign investment has on their economies in response to shifts in economic and political conditions that can occur over time.Governments with shorter time horizons, on the other hand, do not anticipate being in power long into the future and therefore are less concerned about maintaining greater policy freedom.Therefore, I hypothesize that when BITs are signed by governments with LIST OF FIGURESFIGURE PAGE 2.1 FDI Inflows as a Percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation 1990 -2009 (Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2010) . . . . . .
Author: Daniel Blake
Institution: The Ohio State University
Language: English
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2256756404