Year: 2005
Type: article
Abstract: As a result of the injuries inflicted by chemical warfare during the First World War, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was established to ban the use of asphyxiating and poisonous gases in international conflict.However, the possession of such agents was not restricted.The stockpiling of chemical weapons (CW) continued throughout World War II and the Cold War with the development of more lethal and sophisticated agents.The continuing threat of chemical warfare and the actual use of CW in the developing world, including large scale use in the Iran-Iraq war, led to multilateral negotiations in the 1980's to ban the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons.To that end, the Chemical Weapons Convention 1 (CWC) was opened for signatures in January 1993 and subsequently entered force on April 29, 1997.The convention seeks to eliminate stockpiles of agents and weapons possessed by nation states.It was not focused on non-state threats, such as terrorism.The prevailing view among convention negotiators was that to effectively utilize chemical weapons for a military purpose, nation states needed large stockpiles of agents.The CWC was drafted according to the practices of the chemical industry at the time.Essentially, "the framers 15 of the CWC had a sense that they were dealing with a finite universe of potentially CW-capable facilities that the convention had to address."However, recent technological advancements within the chemical industry are challenging the finite nature of these potentially CW-capable facilities even as priority is given to preventing CW acquisition and use by terrorists.In this context, new approaches to standby or breakout technology have the potential to threaten the effectiveness of the CWC's provisions for verification and compliance.The CWC defines chemical weapons comprehensively and contains an unprecedented and intrusive verification mechanism, going far beyond other treaties banning weapons of mass destruction (the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention).Essential to the continued efficacy of both the comprehensiveness and verifiability of the CWC is the provision in Article VIII for Review Conferences to "take into account any relevant scientific and technological development."The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) for the CWC prepared a report 2 on relevant advancements in science and technology for the First Review Conference that took place from April 28 through May 9, 2003.Among others, two key issues arose: first, newly discovered toxic agents "that cause considerable harm" that are not listed on the schedules; and second, the development of new chemical production processes.The former has been debated extensively; the latter has not received much attention.Article II of the CWC defines chemical weapons "as toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes."These included
Author: Thi Thu Quyen Nguyen
Language: English
Topic: Nuclear Issues and Defense
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2265908006