The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law: Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Year: 2010
Type: article
Abstract: THE CAUSATION STANDARDthe various anti-retaliation provisions in all federal employment statutes.11 Using § 107 as a model for amendments to other federal employment statutes would seem attractive to those in Congress concerned about the difficulty of proving intentional discrimination on the basis of either a protected status, such as older age, or against protected activity, such as the assertion of some statutory right like freedom from status discrimination or family or medical leave.While the core meaning of forbidden intentional employment discrimination is clear-considering or taking into account, at least to some degree, a forbidden status category or activity 12 -proving that such consideration actually occurred within the conscious, or unconscious, 13 thought processes of 11.See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against employees of publicly traded companies who report suspected violations of securities law); Federal Juror System Improvement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2006) (amended 2008) (protecting jurors' employment); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 660 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against employees who make complaints or sue under OSHA); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against beneficiaries and participants of ERISA plans for enforcing rights under that statute).Legislation introduced in Congress in October, 2009, to overturn the Gross decision would extend the "motivating" cause standard to "the exercise of any right established by Federal law."S. 1756, 111th Cong.§ 3 (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong.§ 3 (2009); discussion infra note 271.12. The Court, for instance, has made clear in numerous decisions that Title VII liability requires proof only of consideration, not animus toward, plaintiff's protected status.See, e.g., Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) ("[A]bsence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy . . ..");Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 668-69 (1987) (finding that a union cannot take into account race in deciding how to process grievance despite lack of "racial animus" or denigration of blacks); L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708-09 (1978) (finding that actuarially sound nature of gender-based insurance tables does not justify their adoption to determine pension contributions).See generally Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI.L.
Source: Buffalo law review
Author: Michael C. Harper
Institution: Boston University
Language: English
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2272027397
