Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n2p175
Year: 2011
Type: article
Abstract: In this essay, we intend to show that Peter Klein and Marshall Swain defeasibility\ntheories do not resolve the Gettier problem. Klein postulates, to any Gettier counterexample,\nthat there is a true proposition which, when associated with evidence-e of S, genuinely\ndefeats the justification of p to S. Swain postulates that, to any Gettier-type counterexample,\nthere is a true proposition which, when associated with the set of reasons-R of S, ultimately\ndefeats the justification of S to believe p. To show that Klein an Swain proposals do not\nresolve that problem, this essay presents two Gettier-type counterexamples for which there\nare no genuine defeaters of justification of p by e to S and there are no defeaters not ultimately\ndefeated of the justification of the belief of S that p by R. After doing that, we try to\nshow that the obtained conclusion regarding Klein and Swain defeasibility theories can be\nextended to any defeasibility theory of knowledge.
Author: Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi
Institution: Universidade Federal do Piauí
Language: Spanish
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W2294529338
