Year: 2004
Type: article
Abstract: Legal and political theory have paid a great deal of attention to supermajority rules, 1 which require a fraction of votes greater than 1/2 + 1 to change the status quo, and thus empower a minority to block change.In this paper I consider the opposite deviation from simple majority voting: submajority rules, under which a voting minority is granted the affirmative power to change the status quo.Submajority rules are rarely discussed, 2 either because they are assumed not to exist, 3 or because they are assumed to lack any institutional virtues, or because submajoritarian decisions are assumed to be chronically unstable in light of the risk that subsequent majorities will reverse or undo the
Source: bepress Legal Repository
Author: Adrian Vermeule
Institution: University of Chicago
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W22958598
