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Fairness overrides reputation: The importance of fairness considerations in altruistic cooperation

Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: Fairness overrides reputation: The importance of fairness considerations in altruistic cooperation Sule Guney ([email protected]) School of Psychology, University of New South Wales Sydney, Australia Ben R. Newell ([email protected]) School of Psychology, University of New South Wales Sydney, Australia Abstract underlying assumption in this prediction is that both parties care only about how much money they get. However, the vast majority of experimental studies has shown that the modal offers by the Proposers lie between 40%-50% of the total amount and the Responders frequently reject offers below 25% (Guth et al., 1982; Roth, 1995; Henrich et al., 2005). This pattern of results has been replicated cross- culturally (Henrich et al., 2005) and shown to be robust with large stakes (Cameron, 1999). The experiments reported here aimed to investigate the role of several factors (i.e., fairness considerations vs. perceived opportunity of reputation building and future interaction) that might contribute to the emergence of altruistic cooperation in experimental contexts. Behavioural findings in several strategic games indicate that people punish others if they think they are being treated ‘unfairly’ even at the cost of minimizing their own material payoff. We investigated the primary driving force behind such altruistic cooperation. In Experiment 1, we replicated previous findings indicating that the key mechanism contributing to the emergence of altruistic cooperation is fairness considerations. In Experiment 2, we investigated the effect of the opportunity for reputation building and future interaction on altruistic cooperation and found that these factors become effective only when fairness considerations are removed. Keywords: altruistic cooperation; mini ultimatum game, fairness, reputation building, future interaction. Altruistic cooperation as a function of fairness considerations Introduction Human altruistic cooperation presents a puzzle from the perspectives of both the standard economic models of the ‘self-interested actor’ and the evolutionary models of the ‘self-regarding individual’ because it involves some characteristics that are difficult to reconcile with the predictions of standard game theoretical and evolutionary analyses. In particular, these characteristics are rewarding the cooperators (i.e., altruistic rewarding) and punishing the norm violators (i.e., altruistic punishment), at a personal cost, even though the probability that this cost will be repaid (either by third parties or by that specific agent in the future) is very low (Gintis et al., 2003). Evidence for the existence of altruistic cooperation largely comes from laboratory experiments in which the respective behavioral pattern has been observed through economic games. One of the best-known economic games used to demonstrate altruistic cooperation (especially, altruistic punishment) is the Ultimatum Game (UG) (Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982), in which two players are presented with a sum of money, and one of them is assigned to the role of Proposer while the other one to the Responder. The Proposer is asked to offer any portion of the given money to the Responder. If the Responder accepts the amount offered by the Proposer, the money is distributed in accordance with the proposal. If the Responder rejects the offer, both get nothing. According to standard economic theory of self-interest, a rational Proposer offers the minimum possible amount, and a rational Responder never rejects any amount unless it is zero (Binmore, 2007). The Some researchers argue that the underlying mechanism of such non self-regarding behaviors (i.e., high offers by the Proposers and frequent rejections by the Responders) in the UG is not to get as much money as possible, but to maintain fairness norms among players (Gintis et al., 2003; Fehr & Gachter, 2002). In fact, the motivation behind the Proposers’ high offers can be explained with or without the involvement of fairness considerations: They simply may not want to offer an amount that can be easily turned down by the Responder, so they are willing to distribute the money in a relatively fair way. Thus the Proposers’ main concern still might be getting as much as possible in the end, rather than treating the Responders fairly (Declerck et al., 2009). However, for Responders, the role of fairness concerns is more apparent and must be stronger because they seem to accept ending up with nothing rather than being treated unfairly. Even though the Responders could have been better off by accepting any amount offered, they prefer to punish the Proposer’ unfairness, at a cost to themselves. This pattern of response indicates that the Responders engage in altruistic punishment in response to the unfairness of the Proposer. A special version of UG has been used to demonstrate how much the Responders care about unfair acts of the Proposers. The structure of the so-called Mini UG (see Table 1) is the same as the standard UG, with an exception: The Proposer is again asked to distribute an amount of money but unlike the standard UG, only in one of two ways.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2394806387
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