Year: 2004
Type: article
Abstract: Creationism is the conjunction of the following theses: (i) fictional individuals (e.g. Sherlock Holmes) actually exist; (ii) fictional names (e.g., ‘Holmes’) are at least sometimes genuinely referential; (iii) fictional individuals are the creations of the authors who first wrote (or spoke, etc.) about them. CA Creationism is the conjunction of (i) – (iii) and the following thesis: (iv) fictional individuals are contingently existing abstracta; they are non-concrete artifacts of our world and various other possible worlds. Takashi Yagisawa has recently provided a number of arguments designed to show that Creationism is unjustified. I here critically examine three of his challenges to CA Creationism; I argue that each fails to undermine this version of Creationism.
Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien
Author: Jeffrey Goodman
Institution: James Madison University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2421746525
