Year: 2020
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT We study corporate control tracing controlling shareholders for thousands of listed firms from 127 countries over 2004 to 2012. Government and family control is pervasive in civil‐law countries. Blocks are commonplace, but less so in common‐law countries. These patterns apply to large, medium, and small firms. In contrast, the development‐control nexus is heterogeneous; strong for large but absent for small firms. Control correlates strongly with shareholder protection, the stringency of employment contracts and unions power. Conversely, the correlations with creditor rights, legal formalism, and entry regulation appear weak. These patterns support both legal origin and political theories of financial development.
Source: The Journal of Finance
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12889
Authors: GUR AMINADAV, ELIAS PAPAIOANNOU
Institution: London Business School
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: corporate control, controlling shareholders, state ownership, family ownership, firm size, shareholder protection, employment contracts, union power, creditor protection, legal formalism, entry regulation, financial development, legal origins, political economy of finance, cross-national comparison
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2569999548
