The ultimate holding company, corporate governance mechanism, and information transparency of listed companies
Year: 2017
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: this article from the perspective of ultimate controlling shareholder characteristics and corporate governance mechanism, the building two-period dynamic behavior financial theory model and empirical study on the method of combining with time window of shenzhen in 2009-2013 data of listed companies as samples, to study the relations of ultimate controlling shareholder and corporate information transparency.Study found that: based on the control of the pursuit of self-interest, the ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies in information manipulation, and as the controlling shareholder control with the increase of the degree of separation of cash flow right, this kind of information manipulation get intensified; On the contrary, raising the level of cash flow right, the improvement of company internal and external governance mechanism, is to some extent inhibited the excessive information manipulation, which increases the transparency of information. The controlling shareholders(1) the controlling shareholders encroach on information transparency with the company Within the scope of the time, ownership concentration and the big shareholder control become a common phenomenon in the listed company, the company's agency problems mainly for controlling agency problems between large shareholders and external medium and small investors.Actual control people often use the pyramid structure, cross-shareholdings and dual share structure, control and the separation of cash flow rights.When actual controllers and control the greater the degree of separation of cash flow right, the greater the chance of occupy listed company interests (LaPorta, etc., 1999; Claessens, etc., 2002) [1-2].Accordingly, the listed company information disclosure problem could be affected by this kind of agency problem [3][4].Ma Zhonghe xiang-yu wu (2007) found the ultimate control person, the greater the separation of control and cash flow right, the lower the degree of information disclosure of listed companies。(2) corporate governance mechanisms and corporate information transparency Corporate governance mechanisms include not only includes the external governance mechanisms, such as legal, cultural, political, economic, also includes the internal governance mechanism, external institutional ownership, board system, etc.).La Porta et al.Studies have shown that compared with the common law countries, civil law countries to protect the interests of the investors are relatively weak, big shareholders' "tunneling" behavior is relatively serious, unsound investors protection laws to reduce the quality of the accounting information [6].Bushman et al., found that a country's accounting information quality is related to its political and economic environment, while more transparent governance depends on the country's legal system [7].Zhao Ying (2012) study found that the governance environment on the influence of non-financial information disclosure show some effect, but not to the enterprise financial information disclosure regulation is limited [8].To sharp, etc. (2012) to the shenzhen stock exchange during 2004-2007 family of listed companies as samples, the study found that the marketization degree, the rule of law to the family holding enterprise information disclosure quality has significantly positive impact, and the degree of government intervention, no significant difference to the quality of corporate disclosure [9].Wang Huacheng (2007) analysis of listed companies in China such as inner relationship between governance structure and earnings quality.The study found that: the role of 2nd International Conference on Economics, Management Engineering and Education Technology (ICEMEET 2016)
Authors: Zhi-wen Gong, An Xu
Institution: Jingdezhen Ceramic Institute
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W2581361903