Year: 2018
Type: article
Abstract: The current working definition of apathy is a decrease in goal-directed behaviours characterized by reduced interest and emotions that cannot be attributed to diminished levels of consciousness, cognitive impairment or emotional distress (Starkstein and Leentjens, 2008). It thereby constitutes a prominent and disabling symptom by itself or as a component of ‘negative signs’ in strategically-placed focal lesions of the basal ganglia, neurodegenerative diseases such as Parkinson’s disease, certain forms of fronto-temporal dementia, Alzheimer’s and Huntington’s disease and in both schizophrenia and major depression (Bhatia and Marsden, 1994; Levy and Dubois, 2006; Starkstein and Leentjens, 2008). It is widely acknowledged nowadays that apathy is a frequent non-motor symptom in Parkinson’s disease, and affects up to 40% of de novo patients, resulting in a considerable burden for both patients and caregivers (Pagonabarraga et al., 2015). To the best of our knowledge, no study has examined either how apathy emerged as an independent symptom in Parkinson’s disease in the late 19th century, or the conceptual changes which mark its evolution from its early beginnings to its current importance. Such historical assessment might also reveal a parallel delineation of terms relating to both apathy and frontal subcortical circuit disorders. We therefore reviewed articles and textbooks in English, French and German on psychic signs including apathy, anxiety and depression, to determine the historical crossroads in the delineation of apathy in Parkinson’s disease and basal ganglia disorders. Our study ranged from the first description of the disease in 1817 by James Parkinson (1755–1824) in London to the present day. We also carried out an extensive PubMed search using the terms ‘Parkinson’s disease’, ‘psychic signs’, ‘non-motor signs’, ‘anxiety’, ‘depression’, ‘hallucination’, ‘apathy’, ‘abulia’, ‘anhedonia’, ‘psychic akinesia’, ‘athymormia’ and ‘bradyphrenia’. We here briefly recall the philosophical roots of apathy and then present the landmarks which paved the way to the current delineation of apathy in Parkinson’s disease (Fig. 1). Timeline of the conceptual rearrangements of apathy in Parkinson’s disease from Brissaud to Marin and the corresponding breakthrough periods in the history of Parkinson’s disease, with the parallel delineation of neurospychiatric syndromes in basal ganglia disorders. Concepts are depicted as coloured bars. The difference in intensity corresponds to their relative importance in each period, from their initial description onwards. (1) Parkinson’s princeps recollection in 1817 of patients with motor and non-motor signs, including delirium. (2) Ball’s report in 1882 of psychic signs related to Parkinson’s disease, which includes depression and hallucinations. (3) Brissaud’s delineation of ‘absolute apathy’ in 1895 as a specific cognitive, motivational and emotional disturbance in Parkinson’s disease. (4) Wernicke’s then Lewy’s elaboration of the concept of akinesia in the early 20th century. (5) Naville’s explicit definition of bradyphrenia in 1922 as ‘a very frequent and particular state of fatigue and mental fading […] characterized by diminished voluntary attention, spontaneous interest, initiative, effort and work capacity’ in post-encephalitic parkinsonian patients. (6) The advent of l-DOPA therapy in the 1960s, challenging the delineation of Parkinson’s disease-related neuropsychiatric syndromes. (7) Marin’s contribution to the current working definition of apathy in 1991, which enables the investigation of the specific structural and functional brain disorders related to this syndrome. Long before it featured in medical nosography, the term ‘apathy’ existed as a philosophical concept whose meaning changed significantly between Ancient Greek times and the 18th century. Apathy is an old term, derived from the Greek apatheia (a-pathos, i.e. without passion), which is referenced in old manuscripts as in Furetière’s French dictionary published in 1701. For the Stoics of Ancient Greece, the term had positive connotations, and they ‘were proud to experience absolute apathy and to be insensitive to sadness’. They wanted their souls to be in a state of calm and quietness. Greek philosophers also analysed the origins and motivations of human actions. Aristotle claimed that we are moved to action only when we grasp the object of desire (‘orexis’) (37, 39; De Anima 3.10, 433b11-12). Several centuries later in Roman times, both Galen and the first Christians were inspired by Stoic philosophers. In the 18th century, Neostoic philosophers such as John Locke (1632–1704) with his conception of the will, and Thomas Reid (1710–96) and his theories of perception and volition revived the benefits of a virtuous life with adequate control of the passions (Berrios, 1996). Locke defined the will as a human directive faculty with the power to direct the body or mind. A ‘power’ to begin or ‘abstain’, continue or end the ‘actions of our minds’, and ‘motions of our bodies’, ‘barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering’. In David Hume’s philosophy (1711–76), the concept of will or volition relates mainly to the final cause or goal of the action (Berrios, 1996). The goal to be achieved, rather than the motivation behind an action, therefore, better explains the will. In the course of the 19th century, the term apathy was increasingly used in medical nosography with a different meaning. The 1873 edition of the French Littré and Robin medical dictionary, for example, defined apathy as indifference, insensitivity or inability to feel emotions or to react when faced with pleasant—and more importantly—sad events. The incorporation of apathy into Parkinson’s disease nosology, as outlined below, is an illustration of the advances made in the delineation of neuropsychiatric syndromes during the late 19th century. A long time passed between the first description of Parkinson’s disease in 1817 and a complete report of all its psychic signs. In his Essay on the Shaking Palsy, James Parkinson first mentioned psychic symptoms such as delirium and sleep disorders. During the decades 1860–80 in Paris, Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–93) emphasized the absence of mental disability except in the final stages of the disease. True recognition of neuropsychiatric symptoms directly related to Parkinson’s disease was achieved in 1882 with Benjamin Ball’s report (1833–93) on seven patients in Paris (Lees, 1990). Depression and hallucinations were the most frequent psychic manifestations. In Ball’s opinion, Parkinson’s disease was directly responsible for these symptoms, and he took the parallel evolution of motor and psychic symptoms as evidence for this view. In his 1888 textbook on neurology, William Gowers (1845–1915) in London considered that ‘mental depression’ and ‘delusions’ were frequently associated with Parkinson’s disease. The term apathy appeared in Paris as an individualized and specific disabling medical condition in Parkinson’s disease after Charcot’s death. Edouard Brissaud (1852–1909) (Fig. 2), one of Charcot’s pupils, took over the Tuesday lessons at the Salpêtrière from 1893 to 1895. Brissaud devoted two successive lessons to Parkinson’s disease, the 22nd and 23rd, in which he specifically reported psychic signs including apathy (Brissaud, 1895). For the first time, apathy was recognized as a pathological condition and an independent sign alongside other psychiatric features (Fig. 3). Brissaud explicitly defined ‘absolute apathy’ as a state of ‘mixed indifference and lack of reaction to external as well as internal events’, thereby mirroring the lack of spontaneous movement and stiffness in motion. In Brissaud’s words, parkinsonian patients ‘speak no more than they move’, ‘seem unbound from the world’, ‘withdrawn into themselves’ and are ‘indifferent to everything’. Apathy was also clearly separated from depression, anxiety, and cognitive impairment. In Brissaud’s opinion, Parkinson’s disease patients’ apathy could be attributed to a process of ‘intellectual welding’ (soudure intellectuelle in French), which mirrored their motor disability. Apathetic patients remained inert in the absence of external impulse, as if they ‘needed to be provoked’ in order to react, by analogy with physical equilibrium. This similarity in both the motor and psychic manifestations of Parkinson’s disease described by Brissaud, was also reflected by amimia, which mirrored apathetic parkinsonian patients’ internal state of mind. These remarkable and comprehensive insights subsequently proved to be seminal, albeit with some delay. Photograph of Edouard Brissaud. From BIU Santé (Paris); Ref. image: CIPB0163. Extracts from Brissaud’s 23rd lesson on psychic signs in Parkinson’s disease, with special reference to apathy (in French: apathie) (in: gallica.bnf.fr / BnF). Image reference: ark:/12148/bpt6k77374g. During the following years and until World War I, several medical theses recognized apathy as a psychic sign of Parkinson’s disease. However, Brissaud’s specific description of apathy in patients with Parkinson’s disease was not recognized internationally, as can be seen from textbooks by leading German authors such as Heinrich Erb (1840–1921), Hermann Oppenheim (1857–1919) and Emil Kraepelin (1856–1926). The beginning of the 20th century was a period of apparently chaotic but instrumental reorganisation of the terminology of both motor and psychic disorders in Parkinson’s disease with the delineation of akinesia and bradyphrenia. A pivotal contribution followed with Karl Wernicke’s classification (1848–1904) of behavioural syndromes in mental illnesses in 1900 in Berlin (de Ajuriaguerra, 1971). He coined the term akinesia to describe ‘akinetic’, catatonia-like behaviours, as opposed to hyperkinetic behavioural manifestations like mania. Wernicke thereby established a clear-cut dichotomy between akinetic and hyperkinetic syndromes, hypothesising that motor signs actually represent the visible tip of the iceberg of internal psychic movements, also referred to as ‘psychosis of motility’. The meaning of akinesia then mutated under the influence of Wernicke’s pupil Karl Kleist (1870–1960) (de Ajuriaguerra, 1971). He defined akinesia as a syndrome involving loss of initiative and self-drive in behavioural frontal lobe syndromes, notably in patients suffering from brain trauma. This proved a posteriori to be similar to Brissaud’s view on apathy. In 1923, a radical conceptual breakthrough was achieved in Berlin by Friedrich Heinrich Lewy (1885–1950), who used the term akinesia to specifically designate the delay in movement initiation in parkinsonism in his influential textbook (de Ajuriaguerra, 1971). Lewy’s definition of akinesia remains unchallenged. Although ‘apathy’ appeared to give way to other terms, its meaning was preserved by François Naville (1883–1968) (Fig. 4) in Geneva. In 1922 he coined a new term, bradyphrenia (Naville, 1922). Specifically addressing the question of the ‘mental complications of encephalitis lethargica’, he described the syndrome of apathy with remarkable clinical insight separating motor, cognitive and emotional aspects. He described ‘a very frequent and particular state of fatigue and mental fading […] characterized by diminished voluntary attention, spontaneous interest, initiative, effort and work capacity, accompanied by objective fatigue and slight decrease in memory’ (Naville, 1922). Naville’s original contribution was to definitively distinguish cognitive and motivational aspects in the apathetic behaviour of parkinsonian patients with encephalitis lethargica. Aided by the clever psychometric experiments of Claparède, founder of the Geneva school of psychology, he performed a large battery of cognitive tests in the setting of an experimental psychological laboratory. Naville was able to isolate a set of clinical symptoms that he coined ‘bradyphrenia’, describing slowness of thought as a feature separate from slowness of movement and contributing to overall slowness of action. He deciphered a specific disturbance in initiation and novelty seeking, showing that difficulties in problem solving in parkinsonian patients with bradyphrenia are most prominent in tests largely independent from external stimulation and can be much improved following encouragement and repeated external stimulation. According to Naville, ‘it is not only the peripheral execution of movement which is slow, it is not only that time is lost between the given order and the beginning of execution, but it is first and foremost the distribution of orders in movements which is slow and sometimes suspended, [which may disappear] if an external stimulus [is applied]’. He eventually drew a parallel between ‘disorders of motor tone’ and loss of ‘psychic tone’ in post-encephalitic patients. This suggests that Naville intuited shared pathophysiological dysfunction of motor and non-motor symptoms in basal ganglia disorders. His findings were rapidly and positively acknowledged. In the light of the similarities found in the motor features of encephalitis lethargica and patients with Parkinson’s disease, seminal studies were later conducted on bradyphrenia in Parkinson’s disease and its relation to depression. Between 1920 and 1980, no conceptual alterations in the meaning of bradyphrenia occurred. Rogers et al. in London examined the cognitive, affective, and motor components of bradyphrenia in Parkinson’s disease and psychomotor retardation in depression by comparing ‘de novo’ Parkinson’s disease patients with patients with primary depressive illness and normal individuals (Rogers et al., 1987). They observed a direct relationship between bradyphrenia and affective disturbances in both Parkinson’s disease and depression and showed cognitive impairment to have a minor role in bradyphrenia. These results are consistent with Naville’s hypothesis that in Parkinson’s disease, mental slowness is caused not only by slow execution of movements, but also by loss of initiative and self-drive. Photograph of François Naville (in: Bibliothèque de Genève). A number of terms that were either used from the 1970–90s (athymormia, autoactivation deficit, and pure psychic akinesia), or that have been revisited more recently (abulia, anhedonia), have aimed to describe the abnormal behaviour associated with frontal-subcortical circuit impairment. All are worthy of comment, as they have certain features in common with apathy (for a review see Pagonabarraga et al., 2015). From the 1830s, alienists used the term abulia when referring to certain mental disorders in their patients. Interest increased in the 1890s with the work of several psychologists from Paris, Pierre Janet (1859–1947), Alfred Binet (1857–1911) and Theodule Armand Ribot (1839–1916) (Berrios, 1996). These authors defined abulia as the lack or impairment of the power of the will to is in the mind. In this condition is no or of the and frequently is no lack of desire or of of the end but the from and desire to execution or Ribot a in the to the motor in the late 19th century in John that the will was in the and the motor in the (Berrios, 1996). pathological studies abulia with lesions in the basal ganglia and frontal and the term more widely as a condition characterized by reduced spontaneous motor, cognitive, and emotional (Bhatia and Marsden, first by Ribot in is defined as the inability to experience (Berrios, 1996). It is associated with mental disorders such as depression and However, several studies have this symptom to neurodegenerative diseases including Parkinson’s disease. in Parkinson’s disease to be a common to depression, apathy and frontal lobe and could to It is also described in Parkinson’s disease patients with apathy, in de novo patients. is characterized by in and behavioural rather than or in Parkinson’s disease patients with apathy et al., From the to the appeared of behavioural changes in patients with basal ganglia disorders. These a of voluntary a in spontaneous also ‘athymormia’ term first used patients by the and in psychic akinesia’, or of psychic These syndromes were associated with focal lesions of the and of the internal and both and aspects of the et al., and et al. in Paris reported psychic in patients who had from This when the was as if was a loss of i.e. to mental et al., of the patients showed lesions in the basal ganglia, mainly the These patients could for the absence of external described his state as ‘a in The authors emphasized that patients were the of psychic akinesia by external stimulation seen in these patients is very similar to the clinical description of ‘psychic tone’ observed by Naville in patients with mental of encephalitis lethargica (Naville, 1922). describing the behavioural and motor of focal lesions of the basal ganglia in and in London found abulia or ‘psychic as of or with loss of initiative and of spontaneous thought and emotional to be behavioural (Bhatia and Marsden, was to and large lesions in the the and to lesions in the but with in and the term of to the inability to mental that is with external stimulation. The authors that stimulation could the impairment of spontaneous internal and that the of the syndrome was related to basal ganglia and could be from the observed in patients with frontal in patients cognitive, and emotional not normal under external The advent of l-DOPA at the of the was and changed the of life and life of patients with Parkinson’s disease. In an early report (de Ajuriaguerra, de in Geneva the relationship between and l-DOPA appeared more on akinesia than on and had a on This reviewed Lewy’s definition of outlined by de that the terms bradyphrenia and psychic akinesia have been used (Rogers et al., 1987). The of l-DOPA changed our the influence of on and In the early in was one of the first to describe behavioural of l-DOPA and to disease related motor, cognitive and emotional symptoms and their in post-encephalitic parkinsonian patients. According to apathy with emotional in parkinsonism into its coined with l-DOPA features such as in or His are in his on a (Fig. Parkinson’s disease-related apathy as a mental resulting from the at the of psychiatric such as in the of and control the of a of behavioural to or levels of in frontal-subcortical (Pagonabarraga et al., 2015). on a hypothesis on the relationship between the psychiatric symptoms of Parkinson’s disease and to the was subsequently made in by and of the and its could depression and apathy as disease-related symptoms and as an from the early the parallel motor and non-motor of l-DOPA in post-encephalitic parkinsonian patients. apathy, and are into their direct movement and the A Alfred A with of The The advent of brain stimulation in the a breakthrough in Parkinson’s disease. was the of apathy, which could be as a non-motor syndrome apathy, but also anxiety and related to in et al., This apathy could be related to and was to to with et al., Pagonabarraga et al., 2015). Marin in the definition of apathy. He defined the syndrome of apathy as a of primary motivational impairment […] not to disturbance of or of Marin that apathy be as a psychiatric characterized by in goal-directed behaviours, as seen from a in the cognitive and emotional of goal His clearly apathy as a prominent and independent symptom in patients with primary depression and neurodegenerative Apathy as a clinical term was used to to a pathological behaviour characterized by diminished and lack of interest in with emotional and This terms like abulia and and considered abulia to be a of apathy. Marin clearly clinical the of abulia is for patients who are but in their to and to and from a conceptual abulia and apathy are on a of motivational and emotional abulia the more of the 1990). the of apathy as a neuropsychiatric syndrome was into a set of by Starkstein and According to clinical on of diminished goal-directed behaviour is defined as a of effort or to and on from to diminished goal-directed by of interest in new or in new and of and reduced emotional of goal-directed behaviours by or and of emotional to positive or In Levy and the importance of the syndrome of apathy as a of goal-directed and Dubois, that may from of several frontal subcortical or related subcortical the basal ganglia and that the from emotions with and as emotional or to and or related subcortical the basal ganglia that the of of and the setting of for the or and of the internal of the leading to an to or that with ‘a to This of apathy was considered by the authors to be the most of apathy and consistent with the syndrome of also as ‘psychic or ‘athymormia’ and Dubois, However, this view is not established and work is the delineation of the concept of apathy in Parkinson’s disease, which can be considered as a neuropsychiatric syndrome resulting from the structural and functional of different brain and that the of spontaneous mental and the of individuals to emotions with (Pagonabarraga et al., 2015). In with Brissaud’s seminal description more than years apathy can in Parkinson’s disease as a pure psychic syndrome independent from depression, anxiety or other mental disorders. This concept has some to the frequent in Parkinson’s disease of apathy, depression and anxiety as and to the of the contribution of depression and cognitive to the of apathy. the clinical of apathy caused by or to emotional from the emotional symptoms of depression, and from difficulties in or mental as a of dysfunction or more cognitive is an This to patients in clinical and could the for individualized to apathetic symptoms (Pagonabarraga et al., 2015). Brissaud’s initial recognition of apathy as a behavioural syndrome in Parkinson’s disease, apathy emerged as an independent symptom at the crossroads between and apathy is seen as a of how cognitive, emotional and motor features are in basal ganglia including Parkinson’s disease, and how the and definition of specific symptoms instrumental for the study of basal ganglia disorders. The authors at Pierre for in old articles and and for and of the a from
Source: Brain
DOI: 10.1093/brain/awx362
Language: English
Subfield: Neurology
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2783862002
