Year: 2018
Type: report
Abstract: Using an aggregative games approach, we analyze horizontal mergers in a model of multiproduct-firm price competition with nested CES or nested logit demands.We show that the Herfindahl index provides an adequate measure of the welfare distortions introduced by market power, and that the induced change in the naively-computed Herfindahl index is a good approximation for the market power effect of a merger.We also provide conditions under which a merger raises consumer surplus, and conditions under which a myopic, consumer-surplus-based merger approval policy is dynamically optimal.Finally, we study the aggregate surplus and external effects of a merger.
DOI: 10.3386/w24578
Authors: Volker Nocke, Nicolas Schutz
Institutions: University of California, Los Angeles, University of Mannheim
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2800522696
