Justice Scalia's Rhetoric of Dissent: A Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia's Advocacy in the VMI Case
Year: 2002
Type: article
Abstract: Most commentators on Justice Scalia’s dissents properly focus on the substantive merits of his disagreement with his colleagues. After all, if he is illogical, misuses authorities, misreads statutes, or otherwise compromises the integrity of his analysis, then his colleagues on the Court have rightly rejected his opinion. But, as even his critics concede, Justice Scalia is a highly intelligent, resourceful, and experienced advocate for his views. However, successful advocacy depends on more than substantive merit. It also depends on an advocate’s personal credibility and the emotions the advocate provokes when making arguments. The affective or emotive aspects of Justice Scalia’s dissents have always received considerable attention, but this attention frequently focuses on his tone and diction. Even while decrying Justice Scalia’s aggressive tone and word choices as overly personal and ill-tempered, commentators often overlook several subtler rhetorical forces at play in his dissents. For a deeper understanding how these forces work, they should also consult the analytical techniques espoused in the works of Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian over 2,500 years ago.
Author: Michael Frost
Institution: Southwestern Law School
Language: English
Subfield: Communication
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2895864314