Work

Crystal (ball)

Year: 2018

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: Recent major attacks against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and their controller software necessitate domain-specific cyber-physical security protection. Existing offline formal methods for (untrusted) controller code verification usually face state-explosion. On the other hand, runtime monitors for cyber-physical UAVs often lead to too-late notifications about unsafe states that makes timely safe operation recovery impossible.

Source: Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

DOI: 10.1145/3274694.3274724

Authors: Sriharsha Etigowni, Shamina Hossain-McKenzie, Maryam Kazerooni, Katherine Davis, Saman Zonouz

Institutions: Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Texas A&M University

Language: English

Topic: Formal Methods in Verification

Subfield: Computational Theory and Mathematics

Field: Computer Science

Domain: Physical Sciences

Open Access status: bronze

Funder: National Science Foundation

Awards: CPS: Synergy: Collaborative Research: Distributed Just-Ahead-Of-Time Verification of Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructures, CAREER: Trustworthy and Adaptive Intrusion Tolerance Capabilities in Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructures