Work

Manipulations of Equivalent Preference in Parallel Allocation Mechanism

Year: 2020
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: The parallel distribution is a non-centralized mechanism for distributing indivisible items to agents, which can take into account computing efficiency, economic benefits and social equality. However, as most decentralized allocation mechanism, the parallel protocol is not strategy-proof. In this paper, supposed the manipulator has additive preferences with possible indifferences between single objects, we study the most basic manipulation problem under the parallel allocation mechanism. For any given set of items, we proved that the agent1 can determine whether all objects in the set can be guaranteed in polynomial time. In addition, we given an algorithm for finding pessimism and proved the correctness, completeness and time complexity of polynomial.
Language: English
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W3083000218
FWCI: 0.533
Cites: 8
Cited by: 1
Related to: 10