Work

Vulnerability of Microfinance to Strategic Default and Covariate Shocks:Evidence from Pakistan

Year: 2011
Type: report
Study design: Observational Study
Abstract: This paper investigates the repayment behavior of microfinance borrowers in Pakistan. In early 2005, the microfinance institution that provided the loans adopted a new system with strict enforcement of punishment against repayment problems. This reform resulted in a healthy situation with almost zero default rates, overcoming the previous problem of frequent defaults. We hypothesize that strategic default under the joint liability mechanism (i.e., if one group member is hit by a negative shock and faces the difficulty in repayment, the other members who are able to repay may decide to default themselves as well, instead of helping the unlucky person), which was encouraged by weak enforcement of dynamic incentives, was responsible for the earlier failure. Using a unique dataset of about 45,000 installments/repayments covering 2,950 micro-borrower households and over a period of 1998-2006, we investigate the dynamics of repayment at the installment level. We find that the repayment delay of each installment was correlated with other members ’ repayment delay, beyond the level explained by possible correlation of project failures due to locally covariate shocks. We therefore interpret this as evidence
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3121461682
Cites: 29
Cited by: 22
Related to: 9