Work

Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics

Year: 2003

Type: article

Abstract: The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We also discuss welfare-state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries.

Source: Journal of the European Economic Association

DOI: 10.1162/154247603322391170

Authors: Assar Lindbeck, Sten Nyberg, Jörgen W. Weibull

Institutions: Stockholm University, Boston University

Language: English

Topic: Social Policy and Reform Studies

Subfield: Political Science and International Relations

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Decent work and economic growth, Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3122425164

FWCI: 23.65

Cites: 4

Cited by: 88

Related to: 10