Committees and Special Interests
Year: 2008
Type: article
Abstract: This paper studies the aggregation of decentralized information in committees under open and closed voting in the presence of external influence. We show that under one‐sided influence decision quality may be nonmonotonic in the committee members' ability. Furthermore, restricting the information of interest groups may reduce the bias toward special interest politics. This result holds in a single and in a common agency setting, where opposing interest groups' activities do not cancel out in equilibrium. Moreover, there are cases where benefits from increasing the number of decision makers can only be reaped if the committee's sessions are not public.
Authors: MIKE FELGENHAUER, HANS PETER GRÜNER
Institution: University of Mannheim
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3122842017
