Year: 2020
Type: article
Abstract: This article has set out to understand why a large number of public–private partnership (PPP) projects delayed stalled and terminated in the largest PPP program in India. Based on quantitative and case-study-based qualitative research, this study finds that the incomplete nature of PPP contracts, uncertainty and information asymmetry leads to adverse selection, moral hazard, opportunism and holdup of the PPP projects. The inefficacious and inequitable allocation of risks among stakeholders and lack of contract management skills in project authorities exaggerated the problems, and the final outcome is a large number of failed projects and no participation from private developers in future projects defeating the very purpose of adopting the PPP model to build public infrastructure. This study proposes a 20-point conceptual institutional framework suggesting policy and project-level measures for effective execution of the future PPP program in India and developing countries with similar socioeconomic environment post-COVID-19 pandemic amid recessionary conditions. JEL Codes: E6, H5, N7, O2, R4
Source: The Indian Economic Journal
Author: Sandeep G. Kudtarkar
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,000
OpenAlex ID: W3123722073