Year: 2021
Type: article
Abstract: I will present a novel account of justification in terms of knowledge on which one is justified in believingpjust in case one could know thatp. My main aim is to unravel some of the formal properties that justification has in virtue of its connection to knowledge. Assuming that safety is at least a necessary condition for knowledge, I show that justification (1) doesn’t iterate trivially; (2) isn’t a luminous condition; (3) is closed under a certain kind of multi-premise closure principle, but; (4) surprisingly one can nevertheless believe with justification a set of claims that’s jointly inconsistent. This last feature allows for a rather satisfying solution to the preface paradox. Finally, I contrast my account with other knowledge-first accounts of justification.
Source: Philosophical Studies
Author: Jaakko Hirvelä
Institution: University of Helsinki
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,780
Awards: G434337789, G4911300229
OpenAlex ID: W3206235948