Year: 1989
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: During 1988, the IIASA Risk Task Force invited a group of experts to form a collaborating network for a study o n national and international responses to the accident at Chernobrl.This study dealt with responses of society to traumatic events which are able to change social structures for a n extended time period.Specific issues included were: H O W do authorities react, what is the role and behavior of the media system, what are the decisioii making structures, how do international coordination systems function.The documentation of this activity will be publistled by a commercial publisher.During this work a need arose to broaden IIASA'r exposure to opinions and results from experts in the field o f risk research.For this reason a Conference o n "Policy Responses to Large Accidents" was h e l d .a t IIASA from 16-17 January, 1989.The papers presented at this conference have been compiled into this v.olume.They are included a s delivered by the authors without additional editing.Boris ~e ~e r s t g h l Gerhard Kromer IIASA Task Force o n Risk concentration in time and space1 many casualties (not always necessary.Seveso didn't cause any immediate deaths); media attraction.fin accident with no potential for dramatic reporting will not generate broad responses:substantial economic impact; ability to scare people;the accident has an international (or envi ronmenta l ) aspect .This list is in no way complete and some of the characteristics listed will be present or absent from an accident depending on the specific circumstances.The main conclusion of the list is, however, that there is no simple way to classify accidents which create lasting changes in the way society operates.This list gives a too simple view of reality.In a real situation like Europe after Chernobyl, there is a lot of confusion with many stakeholders and conflicting interests making consistent decisionmaking extremely difficult.To this confusion was added the problems caused by lacking information.During the first days and weeks after the accident nobody knew exactly what had happened.Predictions based on what was known were mere a matter of guessing than of knowing as there was a complete lack of p r ~v i o u s experience.Much of what can be found out ~c i e n t i f i c a l l ~, about hot* society responds to accidents has more to do with the dynamics of society than with the technicalities of a specific technological subsystem.The structure of a policy response is quite complex.It involves political, societal, economic and technical issues.One important aspect is the fact that responses are implemented through national and international political processes.As a consequence side issues and political ambitions and confrontations have a tendency to 'muddle the issues' until the original cause of a response has almost totally been forgotten.Science plays a limited role in these activities.Facts are often used only when they support predetermined political positions or destroy arguments of opposing factions.It is, however, of fundamental importance that scientists pay more attention to the societal framework in which economic and technical systems operate.This knowledge is essential in all efforts to create a deeper understanding of the real deep structures and characteristics of these societal subsystems.
Author: Michael Huber
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W33667299