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Reasons and Obstacles for a Logic of Discovery.

Year: 1999
Type: article
Abstract: The possibility of formulating a logic of discovery appeared to have been discarded given the attitude adopted in this regard by the philosophers who developed the standard conception of science.Beginning several decades ago, nonetheless, reactions against this conception have revived interest in the problem.Nowadays, there is a notable tendency to consider the philosophical relevance of the problem of discovery and, as a consequence, 'proposals have been advanced for characterizing the procedures which lead to scientific discoveries.Disconformity with the classical view resides, mainly, in the belief that its principal proponents have utilized a conception that is too narrow in a rational sense and, thus, have excluded from their analysis those aspects of scientific activity that do not conform to a strict logical examination.It is not simple, however, to establish the terms of this debate.There are various interlocking questions and diverse nuances that emerge.Hence, some authors identify rationality with the existence of rules such as those in deductive or inductive logic 1. Others, in contrast, conceive of rationality in a broader sense that includes the consideration of facts, objectives, values, scientific traditions, etc.A third group of authors shares with the more orthodox thinkers the idea that logic should be interpreted in a restricted sense; but I In the present text, for reasons of space, we are not concerned with research carried out in the field of Artificial Intelligence as related to the problem of scientific discovery.However, we consider that the interesting contributions resulting from the design of computer programs which permit the reconstruction of certain scientific discoveries (cf.Langley e.a.1987) would not alter, fundamentally, our conclusions.
Source: Philosophica
Language: English
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W378373376
FWCI:
Cites: 24
Cited by: 1
Related to: 10