Year: 2022
Type: article
Abstract: For more than twenty years, NATO engaged in security assistance in Afghanistan. The engagement represented a colossal politico-military investment in regime renewal. The return of the Taliban to power in 2021 defines a defeat for NATO, we argue. Defeat followed in part from NATO’s strategy deficit: the alliance did not adequately focus on Afghanistan’s political fundamentals; it committed to a ‘comprehensive approach’ campaign blueprint that defied reality; and its decision-making process was too cumbersome and too loaded with political interests to correct course. We also argue that part of the reason for failure resides outside of NATO and with the multiple other actors involved in the conflict. Faced with such complexity, NATO in fact proved operationally agile and resilient. We find that NATO is aware of this challenge of ‘operational agility but strategic deficit’ but that there is no quick fix to what is, essentially, a leadership issue. NATO will improve only if key allies do more to lead in NATO and not for NATO.
Source: LSE Public Policy Review
DOI: 10.31389/lseppr.55
Authors: Sten Rynning, Paal Sigurd Hilde, Michael Cox
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4285199779