Year: 2023
Type: article
Abstract: Perception is riddled with cases of reliable misperception. These are cases in which a perceptual state is tokened inaccurately any time it is tokened under normal conditions. On the face of it, this fact causes trouble for theories that provide an analysis of perceptual content in non‐semantic, non‐intentional, and non‐phenomenal terms, such as those found in Millikan (1984), Fodor (1990), Neander (2017), and Schellenberg (2018). I show how such theories can be extended so that they cover such cases without giving up their core commitments.
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12980
Author: Andrew Rubner
Institution: Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: perceptual content, Millikan, Fodor, Schellenberg
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,630
OpenAlex ID: W4381795005
