Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Which implications follow for the value of freedom on a hybrid account of wellbeing that appeals to endorsement? On the basis of Olsaretti’s empirical claim that one is unlikely to endorse wellbeing when one is forced to achieve it, I show that standardly on the hybrid account there is a reason to protect people’s freedom to dysfunction, and hence that the freedoms to dysfunction are valuable. I also discuss whether freedom is non-specifically valuable on grounds of endorsement. I advance an epistemic version of freedom’s non-specific value that is especially relevant for a theory of justice that appeals to publicity.
Source: Economics and Philosophy
Author: Pietro Intropi
Institution: UCLouvain
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,550
OpenAlex ID: W4406426366