Unexpected costs of performance incentives with production uncertainty: Theory and evidence from a real‐effort laboratory experiment
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Policy advocates often promote market‐like incentives for publicly provided services like education or healthcare (e.g., Medicare). Evidence for performance incentives in these sectors is mixed, possibly due to production uncertainty represented as uncertainty about the marginal effect of inputs. Using a principal‐agent model, we demonstrate that such uncertainty can lead to inefficiencies in output‐based incentives. The model illustrates how employees favor inputs with lower uncertainty and reduce overall effort. Input‐based incentives might be more effective in such cases. We conduct a real‐effort lab experiment which validates these predictions: participants shift from efficient inputs as uncertainty grows, and reduce overall effort.
Source: Economic Inquiry
DOI: 10.1111/ecin.70021
Authors: Michael S. Kofoed, Aaron Phipps
Institution: University of Tennessee at Knoxville
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: Institute of Education Sciences
OpenAlex ID: W4415765868
