Silent Threshold Traitor Tracing & Enhancing Mempool Privacy
Year: 2025
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: The rising commerciality of cryptocurrencies and blockchains in DeFi applications raises the importance of implementing robust methods to protect its regular users against parties with enormous amounts of resources that allows them to balefully influence the market through various Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) strategies. There are typical situations in such scenarios where an end-user may want to hide its transaction details till it has been executed. Ensuring the privacy of pending mempool transactions thus becomes an important goal. To this end, various decentralized versions of threshold encryption (TE) systems have been recently shown particularly effective. In this work we aim to enhance the privacy of such mempool transactions' through a new primitive that we call silent threshold traitor-tracing (ST 3 ). In addition to providing a thresholdized decryption facility through a quorum of some T parties, ST 3 enables public tracing of (at least one) member from such a malicious quorum in TE systems (thereby adding accountability to TE), but without the presence of any trusted authority. For mempool transactions, such a tracing functionality allows to trace member(s) of a malicious decryption committee who are in-charge of validating pending mempool transactions together. Compared to recent works in this space on silent TE (STE) by Garg et al. (CRYPTO 2024) and threshold traitor-tracing (T 3 ) by Boneh et al. (CRYPTO 2024), ST 3 achieves the best of both worlds: It is endowed with a silent setup (like STE) and also allows public tracing in a malicious decryption committee ( unlike T 3 ). Our work resolves two important problems left open by Boneh et al. (CRYPTO 2024). We present two constructions of ST 3 . The first one is a generic compiler whereas the second one is built from the notion of a distributed predicate encryption with pooled decryption (DPEPD) -- a primitive we define and build from bilinear pairings, proving its security in the GGM. DPEPD may be of independent interest with applications beyond ST 3 . Our techniques are inspired from two recent works: one is STE (as above) and the other one is a concurrent work of Branco et al. (ASIACRYPT 2024) that builds traitor-tracing (TT) schemes without a trusted authority. Our second ST 3 scheme achieves a transparent setup -- a property that is deemed largely beneficial for any practical deployment. Further, both our schemes have sublinear ciphertext sizes O (√L), where L is the number of users in the system at any time. We also benchmark a prototype of the second ST 3 scheme in Go to demonstrate its application in encrypted mempools. Our results showcase the practicality of our schemes: For L= 256 parties with a threshold T = ⌊ 2L/3⌋ = 170, encryption, partial decryption, decryption aggregation and tracing algorithms take 166.8 ms, 15.8 ms, 589 ms and 9195 ms respectively with a ciphertext size of 12.57 KB.
Authors: Anirban Chakrabarti, Monosij Maitra, Arup Mondal, Kushaz Sehgal
Language: English
Subfield: Computer Networks and Communications
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Award: G4691887019
OpenAlex ID: W4416549331
