Work

On the stability of equilibria in incomplete information games under ambiguity

Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: In this paper, we look at the (Kajii and Ui) mixed equilibrium notion, which has been recognized by previous literature as a natural solution concept for incomplete information games in which players have multiple priors on the space of payoff relevant states. We investigate the problem of stability of mixed equilibria with respect to perturbations on the sets of multiple priors. We find out that the (Painlevé-Kuratowski) convergence of posteriors ensures that stability holds; whereas, convergence of priors is not enough to obtain stability since it does not always implies convergence of posteriors when we consider updating rules (for multiple priors) based on the classical Bayesian approach.
Language: English
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W52203402
FWCI: 0.349
Cites:
Cited by: 1
Related to: 10