Work

Negotiations as Usual. Putting Domestic Constraints on the Table in the Council of the European Union

Year: 2015
Type: dissertation
Abstract: The argument developed in this thesis is that negotiations in the Council of the European Union cannot\nbe understood in isolation from the domestic politics of the member states. Building on the logic of\nRobert Putnam’s two-level game theory, and the fact that negotiated EU agreements need to gain\nsupport from vital parts of the governments’ domestic constituencies, government negotiators are\nconstrained by their domestic political actors. This is part of the democratic political system in which\ngovernments should be responsive to the wills of their domestic constituency. Apart from tying the\nhands of the negotiators, it has often been suggested that these domestic constraints should make\nnegotiators more influential in negotiations, since it would prevent them from being pushed around\nand agreeing to unfavourable deals. This relationship between domestic constraints and influence in\nthe Council of the EU is the main interest of this thesis.\nIn the thesis, the negotiation process is in focus and the communication of domestic constraints in\nnegotiations is given a more prominent role than in previous research. The expectation is that if\ndomestic constraints should make negotiators more influential, information about the domestic\nconstraints needs to be spread to the negotiating adversaries. In the thesis, theoretical work is also\ndone regarding the difference between traditional intergovernmental negotiations and the negotiations\nbetween the member states in the EU. A crucial assumption in the domestic constraints theory is that\nthere is a possibility to defect from concluded agreements if they do not gain domestic support, and the\npossibility to defect therefore makes it possible to employ a threat of domestic defection if agreements\ndo not meet the domestic constraints. In this regard, EU negotiations differ from other international\nnegotiations, since ex post defection in practice is not a possibility for EU agreements. In the first\nempirical section of this thesis, relying on a set of qualitative interviews with member state negotiators\nin the Council, it is therefore empirically explored how domestic constraints are communicated in this\nsetting, where a threat of defection is practically impossible. In the second and third empirical\nsections, which rely on a survey with member state negotiators in the Council, it is evaluated which\nnegotiators are most likely to communicate domestic constraints, and whether frequently\ncommunicating domestic constraints leads to influence in the Council.\nTwo primary results emanate from the empirical analyses. First, it is shown that studying the\ncommunication of domestic constraints is important, if it should be possible to make relevant\ninferences about the effect of domestic constraints on influence. Secondly, it is shown that domestic\nconstraints are communicated and lead to influence, even when domestic defection is not a possibility.\nThis is done through practices associated with the everyday negotiations in the Council, which makes\nthe communication of domestic constraints part of the ordinary negotiations in the Council of the EU.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W565600361
Cites: 4
Cited by: 6
Related to: 9