Year: 1995
Type: article
Abstract: The nation’s concernwith drug-controlpolicyhasescalated in recent years. This heightened anxiety is reflected in the growth of federal drug-control budget authorityappropriated by the Congress. In fiscal year 1985 thesebudgetary obligations were $2.75billion; by 1994 they had risen to $12.14 billion (U.S. Department of Justice 1994a: 19),1 The out-of-pocket drug-controlexpenditures made by the criminal justice system—at all levels of government, not just federal—repre-sent only a portion of the total cost of drug enforcement activities. Economists, most notably Milton Friedman (1991: 57) and William Niskanen (1992: 238), have argued that the war on illicit drugs has diverted police resources away from other lawenforcement activities, with the result that violent crimes and crimes against property have been higher than they would otherwise have been.2 To the extent that communities divert law enforcement resources from violent crimes to illegal drug offenses, the risk of punishment for engaging in violent crimes is reduced. A reduction in this risk would be expected to increase the incidence of violent crimes. This paper seeks to determine empirically the response, if any, in the
Source: Cato Journal
Author: Harold J. Brumm
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W60384384
