Work

Limits of reductionism.

Year: 1998
Type: dissertation
Abstract: The central claim of this thesis is that physicalism is not well supported by our scientific knowledge.The argument splits into four sections.In section I, I argue that given the current state of science a reductive version of physicalism cannot be maintained, if theoretical reductions are thought to be obtainable in practice.In section II, I argue that physicalists who are realists about higher-order properties are committed to reduction in principle of these properties to physics.In section III, I argue that one of the core elements of physicalist philosophy, the completeness of physics, is highly questionable in light of certain features of quantum theory.In the final section, I survey a range of possible alternatives ontologies to physicalism and argue for a pluralistic ontology.
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W6992560527
Cites: 18
Cited by:
Related to: 10