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Screening Under A Fixed Cost of Misrepresentation

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Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.6150211
Authors: Sergei Severinov, Yin Chi Tam
Institutions: University of British Columbia, East China University of Science and Technology
Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications
Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: mechanism design, incentive constraints, first-best efficiency, exclusion, bunching, private information, optimal allocation

Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7126092011
Cites: 33
Cited by:
Related to: 10
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