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Coalitional Game-Based Reward Distribution Model Considering Point-Cloud Overlap and Minimization of Maximum Dissatisfaction

Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Digital Twin Cities hold immense potential for improving urban life by leveraging vast point-cloud datasets. However, the prohibitive costs of centralized sensor deployment hinder large-scale data collection, necessitating participatory sensing models. A critical challenge in such models is designing an incentive mechanism that distributes rewards fairly and stably to citizen data providers. This paper proposes a cooperative game-theoretic framework to distribute a fixed monetary budget from data consumers. We define a threshold-based characteristic function that evaluates contributions based on both spatial coverage and data quality. Using the principle of strategic equivalence, this point-based value is converted into monetary rewards, which are then distributed using the Shapley value, prioritizing fairness, and the nucleolus, prioritizing stability. Numerical analyses reveal that while the Shapley value can result in participant dissatisfaction (positive excess) under certain conditions where cooperation is critical, the nucleolus consistently minimizes this dissatisfaction, ensuring a stable distribution within the core. Furthermore, an evaluation with varying participant numbers demonstrates that the nucleolus maintains robust superiority in minimizing maximum excess across all scenarios, proving its suitability for sustainable participatory sensing ecosystems.
Source: IEEE Access
Language: English
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,075
OpenAlex ID: W7128314210
FWCI:
Cites: 24
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Related to: 10