Understanding and Exploiting DNS Relaying: Harnessing Legitimate Services for DNS Attacks
Year: 2026
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: We introduce a novel technique, DNS relaying, exploiting the fact that many services (CDNs, web/email servers) perform DNS lookups for arbitrary hostnames from untrusted clients. Consequently, DNS relaying turns legitimate services into intermediaries, relaying attacker-originated messages via DNS requests to (internal) resolvers and, ultimately, to target nameservers. Our investigation reveals the root causes of this behavior across various services, including request routing, domain ownership verification, sender tracking, user experience enhancements, and security inspections. Importantly, we uncover a new response-latency covert channel that enables bi-directional communication over these DNS relays. By exploiting benign services as relays, DNS relaying circumvents modern security perimeters and amplifies the impact of DNS attacks. We demonstrate that DNS relaying enhances three legacy DNS attacks by enabling relayed DNS tunneling to bypass edge security, relayed DNS amplification, and relayed DNS exploit to reach otherwise inaccessible DNS servers and clients. Our Internet-wide measurement shows that relayed DNS tunneling can achieve 1,400 bits/request exfiltration and 6 bits/request infiltration; relayed DNS amplification can reach a 535-times packet amplification factor; and DNS relaying expands the DNS exploit attack surface by 8 times in terms of reachable server IPs. We responsibly disclosed our findings to 15 major vendors, receiving acknowledgments from multiple parties. The most affected vendor, Akamai, specifically recognized DNS relaying as a security threat due to our discovered practical infiltration channel.
Institution: Palo Alto Networks (United States)
Language: English
Subfield: Computer Networks and Communications
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W7167675615
