The Impact of Corruption on Political Party Financing in Nigeria and the Social Implications on the Citizenry
Year: 2026
Type: article
Study design: Observational Study
Abstract: Corruption in political party financing remains a critical obstacle to democratic consolidation in Nigeria, exacerbating inequality and eroding citizen trust in public institutions. This study investigates the extent to which opaque party financing fuels vote-buying, the effect of perceived electoral corruption on trust in government, the role of regulatory trust in mitigating perceived bias, and the moderating influence of awareness of anti-discrimination legislation on the relationship between bias and perceived cost fairness. Drawing on principal-agent, rent-seeking, and institutional theories, a quantitative cross-sectional survey was administered to 67 respondents across Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones, yielding a 75 % response rate (n = 50). A structured questionnaire with 5-point Likert items captured latent constructs, which were coded numerically, reverse-coded where necessary, and aggregated into composite scales. Reliability analysis produced Cronbach’s α values ranging from 0.78 to 0.89, indicating good internal consistency. Correlation analysis revealed significant bivariate associations among opacity, vote-buying, perceived corruption, trust, bias, and cost fairness (p < 0.05). Logistic regression showed that higher perceived opacity increased the odds of reporting vote-buying (OR = 2.18, p < 0.001), with a stronger effect in zones with higher Gini coefficients (interaction OR = 1.38, p < 0.001). Ordinary least-squares regressions confirmed that perceived electoral corruption reduced trust in government (β = -0.31, p < 0.001), greater trust in regulators lowered perceived bias (β = -0.30, p < 0.001), and awareness of anti-discrimination law attenuated the negative impact of bias on cost fairness (β = 0.22, p = 0.002). Diagnostic tests (VIF < 2, Durbin-Watson ≈ 1.9, Breusch-Pagan p = 0.128) indicated model adequacy, and robustness checks (split-sample, median scaling, bootstrapping) confirmed stability of the results. All four hypotheses were supported, aligning with prior research (Kaufmann et al., 2022; Levi, 2019; Mishra, 2015). Theoretically, the study extends principal-agent and rent-seeking frameworks to Nigeria, showing that opacity creates agency loss and amplifies rent-seeking in high-inequality regions (Kura, 2014). The moderating effect of legal awareness on bias-cost links contributes to procedural fairness literature (Chouldechova & Roth, 2020) and suggests that legitimacy can be restored through information campaigns. Practically, improving campaign-finance transparency and strengthening anti-money-laundering oversight can reduce vote-buying and restore voter confidence, essential for future elections. The positive interaction between opacity and regional inequality highlights the need for targeted anti-corruption audits in the North-East and South-South zones. Addressing both symptoms and structural drivers of corrupt financing can foster a more equitable political marketplace and mitigate adverse social outcomes. These insights should guide policy reforms aimed at sustainable democratic development in Nigeria.
Author: Uchenna Kalu Uduka
Institution: Abia State University
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Funder: University of Cambridge
OpenAlex ID: W7204256264
