Replication Data for: Live for Today, Hope for Tomorrow? Rethinking Gamson's Law
Year: 2026
Type: dataset
Abstract: The empirical phenomenon termed Gamson's Law is well-known but lacks firm theoretical foundations. In fact, Gamson's Law is a real puzzle, as most models of coalition bargaining suggest that bargaining strength determines the division of portfolios, which, in turn, suggests that portfolios should rarely be allocated proportionally. I propose a theory of portfolio allocation that emphasizes the need to maintain, rather than simply to form, coalitions. The desire to maintain the coalition provides the parties with radically different incentives, i.e., instead of maximizing their share in the short run, they face a trade-off; taking too many portfolios means that one's coalition partner can be bought off rather easily. Forming a stable coalition requires making it expensive to buy coalition partners off. I test hypotheses derived from the model with data on portfolio allocations in coalition cabinets across Europe.
Source: Harvard Dataverse
DOI: 10.7910/dvn/ewwoip
Author: Indridason, Indridi
Institution: University of California, Riverside
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7204755407
