Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Europe’s defense industrial base (DIB) weaknesses are commonly attributed to underinvestment, fragmented policies, or a lack of European cohesiveness. This article advances an alternative explanation: European defense industrial dependency has emerged through institutionalized alliance structures that systematically privileged US capabilities and incentives, becoming self-reinforcing and difficult for European actors to exit, even as their strategic preferences evolved. Drawing on dependency theory, path dependence, and theories of alliance politics, this article argues that transatlantic security arrangements established during the early Cold War, most notably NATO’s integrated command structures, defense procurement norms, and interoperability requirements, have generated long-lasting asymmetries in production, technology, and market access. Rather than framing dependency as the product of deliberate US design or European unwillingness, the analysis conceptualizes it as a structural outcome of mutually reinforcing choices made by both American and European actors. While US policies prioritized alliance cohesion, operational effectiveness, and interoperability, European states have consistently favored security guarantees and cost efficiency over long-term industrial autonomy. Over time, these rational choices produced technological lock-in, fragmented European production, and persistent reliance on US defense-industrial supply chains. The consequences of this arrangement have become particularly visible during the Russia-Ukraine War, which has exposed Europe’s limited capacity to generate sufficient stocks of ammunition and advanced systems at scale. Through a comparative analysis of US and European decision-making since World War II, the article demonstrates how institutional inertia and alliance incentives have constrained Europe’s defense-industrial development.
Source: Journal of Strategic Security
Author: Diane M Zorri
Institution: Norwich University
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W7204863170