Work

Prêt á Voter: a System Perspective

Year: 2005
Type: report
Abstract: Numerous cryptographic voting schemes have been proposed in recent years. Many of these have highly desirable formal security properties. However, as with all security systems, even a well-designed technical system can be undermined by implementation details or environmental factors, typically including human users, that violate (often implicit) assumptions of the design and evaluation. In `Cryptographic Voting Protocols: a System Perspective[11] Karlof et al perform a systems-based analysis of the Chaum [5] and Neff [17],[18],[19] schemes. They identify a number of vulnerabilities and discuss possible mitigations and counter-measures. In this paper, we examine the extent to which these vulnerabilities carry over to the Prêt á Voter scheme [6]. In addition, we describe some further systems-based vulnerabilities not identified in [11]. We also discuss some further threats, such as chain voting attacks, which do not apply to the Chaum or Neff schemes but to which Prêt á Voter is vulnerable, unless appropriate countermeasures are deployed. It turns out that Prêt á Voter is remarkably robust to most of the vulnerabilities described in [11] and here.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7221041069
Cites:
Cited by: 30
Related to: 10