Type: article
Abstract: Recent work on animal consciousness urges a multidimensional picture: species differ in their consciousness profiles across several dimensions, yet there is taken to be an ontological edge between conscious and non-conscious organisms. I argue that, if we understand the multidimensional idea as a claim about the structure of consciousness, this edge cannot be uniquely sharp. On that understanding, phenomenal consciousness depends on several partly independent dimensions, admits overall degrees with a minimal threshold, and any such degree must result from an aggregation rule. Plausible structural constraints leave room for multiple admissible aggregation rules that diverge on some low but non-trivial profiles. Hence, there are borderline cases at the transition between non-conscious and minimally conscious systems. I then consider the implications of such borderline consciousness for precautionary reasoning and regulatory decision-making. For some taxa and systems, further empirical evidence about their profiles may not remove all indeterminacy in the conscious/non-conscious classification. In such cases, borderline status is not merely a temporary product of incomplete evidence, but a structural feature that practical decision-making may need to represent when considering proportionate precautionary safeguards.
Author: Carranza-Pinedo, Victor
Institution: University of Münster
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225439629