Work

Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization's Penalties and the Nature of Self-Regulation

Year: 2012
Type: article
Abstract: Few issues are as poorly understood and under-theorized as the concept of "industry self-regulation."The Second Circuit recently raised important issues about the nature of such self-regulations when it held that the industry's self-regulatory agency, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), 1 lacked the authority to judicially enforce the fines it levies against member broker-dealers.2 In this Article we provide a theoretical framework for understanding the nature of self-regulation and then discuss the role of courts in effectuating the self-regulatory process.Our thesis is simple: the success of industry self-regulation critically depends on the market power of the firms in the self-regulatory organization ("SRO").If the firms have market power, then as long as the industry generates profits for members, self-regulation can work.But if either profitability or market power decline, self-regulation will fail.We believe that our analysis leads to a deeper understanding of the appropriate relationship * Jonathan Macey is the Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corprate Finance and Securities Law at Yale Law School.Caroline Novogrod is an associate at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP.1.With approximately 3300 employees and twenty regional offices in addition to principal offices in New York City and Washington, D.C., FINRA is "the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States.FINRA's mission is to protect America's investors by making sure the securities industry operates fairly
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W77765211
FWCI: 1.604
Cites: 1
Cited by: 13
Related to: 10