Privacy and Information Acquisition in Competitive Markets
Year: 2004
Type: preprint
Abstract: Personal privacy is studied in the context of a competitive product (or labor) market. Contracts are incomplete because the amount of information firms acquire about applicants cannot be observed. When information acquisition corresponds to searching for bad (good) news, firms search too much (too little) in equilibrium. Consumers can ameliorate this by demanding inefficiently small levels of output. If price discrimination is prohibited, then members of high-risk groups suffer disproportionately high rejection rates. Finally, if rejected applicants remain in the market, then the resulting adverse selection can be so severe that all parties would be better off if no information was collected.
Author: Curtis R. Taylor
Institution: Duke University
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: National Science Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W2104361062
