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Privacy and Information Acquisition in Competitive Markets

Year: 2004
Type: preprint
Abstract: Personal privacy is studied in the context of a competitive product (or labor) market. Contracts are incomplete because the amount of information firms acquire about applicants cannot be observed. When information acquisition corresponds to searching for bad (good) news, firms search too much (too little) in equilibrium. Consumers can ameliorate this by demanding inefficiently small levels of output. If price discrimination is prohibited, then members of high-risk groups suffer disproportionately high rejection rates. Finally, if rejected applicants remain in the market, then the resulting adverse selection can be so severe that all parties would be better off if no information was collected.
Institution: Duke University
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2104361062
Cites: 18
Cited by: 24
Related to: 10