Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion
Year: 2006
Type: article
Abstract: We examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for PCO arrangements to facilitate tacit collusion and also examine how tacit collusion is affected when firms' controllers make direct passive investments in rival firms.
Source: The RAND Journal of Economics
Authors: David Gilo, Yossi Moshe, Yossi Spiegel
Institutions: Tel Aviv University, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3021725422
