From ‘Code’ to ‘Guidance’: Revising the Instrument on Data and Employment
Year: 2022
Type: article
Abstract: Employers have long been interested in data-driven people management. Frederick Taylor was already arguing for a ‘scientific management’ approach to labour by the late 1800s,1 and Henry Ford was known to patrol his factory floor with a stopwatch, timing workers’ motions.2 Technological changes have opened the floodgates to these practices on a much wider scale.3 Workers across the socio-economic spectrum can be evaluated along multiple axes in real-time – through GPS monitors, wearable sensors, keystroke trackers, screenshots, communication sentiment analysis and more.4 The rise of machine learning has enabled the identification of hidden correlations in these huge datasets, and big data analytics has morphed into ‘people analytics’.5 The potential harms of such practices are both deep and diffuse.6 Yet many of these harms – from health and safety violations to privacy invasions – are age-old issues in the labour context, and are consequently dealt with under various existing laws.7 Meanwhile, the personal data processing operations which underpin most algorithmic management tools are largely dealt with under data protection law.8 A comprehensive review of the legal implications of algorithmic management recently concluded that while there are ‘significant gaps in the legal protection’, there are also various ‘current laws [which] are potentially effective’ and ‘important steps… should be taken to ensure that these laws are better known’.9 That employers are struggling to understand and apply the law on algorithmic management is clear from the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS)’s recent call for views on reforming data protection law.10 Two examples are particularly telling. The first relates to the obligation for data controllers to carry out a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) prior to processing which is ‘likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons’.11 Article 36 GDPR requires data controllers to ‘consult the Commissioner prior to processing’ where a DPIA indicates that processing would result in an unmitigable high risk to the rights and interests of the data subjects. Few controllers deem such consultation to be necessary: as of December 2021, the UK data protection authority had been approached just 17 times by data controllers proposing high-risk processing; only two of these cases were employment-related.12 These low numbers stand in contrast with the many documented cases of workers’ personal data being processed with inadequate mitigations for risks to rights and freedoms,13 indicating that employer compliance with Article 36 is limited at best. In its recent consultation, DCMS proposed to remove the mandatory consultation requirement altogether and replace it with ‘collaborative dialogue between organisations and the ICO’.14 Following stakeholder feedback, DCMS has continued to insist that it will proceed with the proposal of removing the mandatory requirement in favour of a voluntary mechanism.15 This response seems perverse: the answer to a lack of clarity should be clarification, not abolition. DCMS’ proposals cast a similar shadow of uncertainty over the current requirement for automated decisions with significant effect to receive meaningful human review.16 The consultation highlights the lack of case law on how the requirement ‘works in practice, or indeed how the UK GDPR is interpreted in specific AI contexts’,17 with the application of the provision to the use of algorithmic tools in recruitment to automatically reject applicants at the sift stage being given as a specific example.18 DCMS sought views on the complete removal of the human oversight requirement,19 again responding to a lack of clarity by proposing to abolish the protection altogether. After the ‘vast majority of respondents opposed the proposal to remove Article 22, with respondents noting that the right to human review of an automated decision was a key safeguard’,20 DCMS instead declared that it would consider ‘how to amend Article 22 to clarify the circumstances in which the Article must apply’. The urgent need for clarity should mean that the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)’s proposed employment guidance is welcome.21 Unfortunately, the current proposals suffer from some serious shortcomings. In part, these shortcomings stem from a lack of ambition on the part of the ICO: despite significant contextual changes, the proposed instrument would retain a structure which dates back to 2005.22 Other problems are more fundamental. The existing ‘code of practice’ on data protection and employment will be replaced with mere ‘guidance’ which will have no legal significance; and the new instrument will focus narrowly on data protection law, leaving workers and employers to decipher its interaction with the myriad other codes of practice. In short, guidance is needed, but the substance and form of the forthcoming instrument will not fulfil the necessary function. These issues are symptomatic of a broader phenomenon in both the labour context and the data protection context: quasi-legislative instruments have been promulgated over the course of decades without adequate thought being given to their objectives or to the structural and constitutional decisions necessary to ensure those objectives are met. Rather than proceeding with the proposals on guiding employer data practices, the ICO and policymakers should take the opportunity to step back to reassess how employer data practices should be guided. This article proceeds by first highlighting some key internal shortcomings in the forthcoming quasi-legislation. Section 3 takes a step back to consider the legal insignificance of the instrument, while section 4 takes an even wider lens, highlighting the difficult questions which must be answered if any guidance instrument is to be effective. Section 5 places the ICO’s proposed instrument in context, explaining why issuing separate instruments on different aspects of the employment relationship is ultimately unhelpful. We conclude by calling for a broader rethinking of the status and purpose of ‘quasi-legislation’ in the employment context, and we highlight how the rise of algorithmic management – which creates novel interactions between historically discrete areas of law – could be a key inflection point to inspire this rethinking. The proposed instrument explaining the law on employer data practices seems promising. Even on its own terms, however, the ICO’s proposal is flawed. Since its first iteration in 2005, the Employment Practices Code has been structured around four topic areas: recruitment, selection and verification; employment records; monitoring at work; and information about workers’ health.23 The intention was that each part could ‘stand alone’, with employers advised to ‘choose’ parts of the code depending on ‘the relevance to [their] organisation of each area covered’.24 From an historical perspective, division into the four topic areas made sense. The technology which employers used to monitor workers once differed from that used in recruitment, for example; and different data protection considerations applied to the different activities. Such a division is no longer tenable. Management is now mediated through all-in-one software packages which fully or partially automate numerous HR functions – including recruitment, pay, scheduling, employee monitoring and performance management.25 Any attempt to define employers’ data protection obligations by activity will thus be both over- and under-determinative: over-determinative because the same obligations will apply to all activities, resulting in repetition throughout the guidance; and under-determinative because confining the discussion to certain activities may give a false impression that data protection considerations only arise in those instances. Imagine, for example, an employer who is considering purchasing a service in which an algorithm vendor captures event logs from a handheld scanner at a warehouse. The event logs are stored by the vendor and analysed to generate monthly employee performance scores. To determine the legality of this proposal, should the employer look at ‘employment records’ or ‘monitoring’? Similarly, some employers track their employees’ physical movements for occupational health and safety reasons.26 Where records are generated and stored, should employers look for guidance under ‘employment records’ or ‘health’? While some issues thus fall to be dealt with repeatedly under multiple headings, other pervasive practices would appear to fall through the cracks: under what section would data processing for automated scheduling or automated pay be covered, for example? The ICO has explicitly recognised that ‘[m]uch has changed’ since the old Code was issued,27 and its stated aims in updating the Code include ‘reflect[ing] the changes in the way employers use technology and interact with staff’.28 Despite this recognition, the ICO’s initial call for views proposed that the new guidance should ‘retain [the original four] topic areas’.29 A few months later, the ICO summarised the consultation responses: many suggested that the guidance would ‘need to address other topic areas’, including ‘cross-cutting topics’ such as ‘the increasing use of AI and algorithmic decision-making… impacting on several areas, including… recruitment… monitoring… performance management… [and] allocation of work’.30 Some suggested that a more fundamental restructuring might be necessary, such as by reference to the data protection principles.31 The ICO nonetheless reiterated that ‘[w]e think the new guidance should retain the four main topic areas from the [old] code’.32 Fixing the structure of the instrument would not be a silver bullet. Despite replacing the Employment Practices Code, the ICO has been clear that it has ‘no plans to issue a new code of practice in this area’33 – the new instrument will be mere ‘guidance’. The reason for the apparent downgrade is that the Data Protection Act 2018 withdrew the ICO’s power to issue ‘codes of practice’ autonomously, which it had relied upon to issue the first Employment Practices Code.34 The rationale behind this withdrawal is hard to divine35 and stands in contrast with the powers afforded to Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) and the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC).36 In a context of rising risk, a shift from ‘code’ to ‘guidance’ might seem concerning. Confusingly, though, the downgrade is actually of no legal significance. Although the old instrument had the facial authority of being called a ‘code of practice’, unlike the ACAS and EHRC codes37 it too had no legal status before courts or tribunals.38 The implications of this became clear when an employee was dismissed on the basis of information obtained through covert video surveillance.39 The Employment Appeal Tribunal considered the alleged violation of the Employment Practices Code as irrelevant to the fairness of the dismissal, pointing out that: The Employment Practices Data Protection Code is expressly guidance. No statutory provision requires it to be paid regard to… It is not obvious to see why ignorance of a code which the employer was not bound in law to have regard to in any event would render an investigation into the wrongdoing of the Claimant unreasonable when it would otherwise have been reasonable.40 To understand the nature of ‘codes of practice’ in data protection law, a brief review of history is necessary. ‘Codes of practice’ first appeared in the Data Protection Act 1984 as wholly voluntary instruments drawn up by trade associations to provide ‘guidance in complying with the data protection principles’.41 The Data Protection Act 1998 altered this position by extending the power to create ‘codes of practice’ to the Information Commissioner.42 The Commissioner had already had the power to disseminate ‘information’ about data protection law, so this addition merely permitted a more authoritative name to be given to formal guidance.43 It was this new power to issue ‘codes’ without legal effect which formed the basis for the Employment Practices Code. However, by 2008, the wholly voluntary nature of codes had proven unsatisfactory: a report on data sharing co-authored by the Information Commissioner suggested that data controllers were relying on a ‘plethora’ of ‘piecemeal and outdated guidance’, and that a statutory code of practice on the issue – that is, a code of practice with some legal status – should be created.44 An amendment to primary legislation was duly made in 2009, requiring the Information Commissioner to promulgate a data-sharing code which tribunals and courts would be required to take it ‘into account’ when dealing with relevant questions.45 Surprisingly, this new legal status was not extended to other existing data protection ‘codes of practice’, such as the Employment Practices Code, which in legal terms remained mere guidance. A confusing two-tier framework thus emerged. This is particularly surprising when one considers that the 2008 report had itself challenged the ‘piecemeal’ nature of the guidance and had noted that a requirement for courts to consider a data sharing code would be ‘in keeping with similar codes in other fields’, including Despite its apparent the two-tier structure of codes of practice was when statutory codes were in and The history no rationale for the confusing and indeed the issue to have been over in some The ICO’s not even to the that: The ICO is required under the Data Protection Act 2018 to four codes of The 2018 also the of to the ICO to other codes of ‘codes of practice’ can now be only by the trade associations retain the authority to issue voluntary ‘codes of compliance with which can to with certain of the Data Protection Although the is there is a risk that it will impact on indicates that employers are already ‘guidance’ promulgated by the Yet the of ‘codes’ legal status also While one might that the of ‘codes of practice’ over the two decades to have been by the is the an of on ‘quasi-legislation’ such as codes of practice that many instruments were recent to have any and while on employer of the Code of out by the Commission for Equality in we can no on the impact of codes in employment since A report on the ACAS Code of on and that that Code but given its legal the is not on the ACAS Code of on of information to trade the instrument to be of in the The of it difficult to any about what status an instrument guiding employer data practices should have in to be effective. This is a for but it is not one that has been the issue of status was not even in the ICO’s initial The legal status of a instrument is, not only an It is also a constitutional While ‘quasi-legislation’ is now a and part of the its has not been codes of practice for the context became from the to about requiring such instruments to be into account’ by courts and was the that codes of practice could be used to which had not been by receive the most for their is the which no analysis of codes or opportunity for This is not to that is has that not have the effect which a statutory provision or a statutory instrument would must their own the has the when it to statutory by the can it or statutory where guidance is given to an of it should be in that only the courts can the law The instruments however, without codes of practice were in the for of apparent of which workers’ rights in The Code on for example, suggested a of at any – a which not in the but which to to this in to by the is that impacting should be in a code than the of the It to the the to a decision and for While these codes no the of there are that codes are being used by the to A recent is the of a new code of practice’ on and and the have long been made for specific changes to be made in to the same but a on and practices to a in can be in data protection for a statutory into data protection by in the instead a statutory Meanwhile, about oversight recent proposals on certain data protection codes of practice have suggested replacing the with In short, codes of practice should not be as a between to and to legal that it is that the proposed guidance on employer data practices for a to algorithmic including in a recent report by an While the from the ICO than the the risk that the of a code of practice will the response to for that law the The of replacing the Employment Practices Code with ‘guidance’ has both and constitutional To be of and constitutional the purpose of the instrument must be will the new legal or The ICO’s stated intention is to provide a more which the changes in data protection the changes in the way employers use technology and interact with and the of the people who use [the guidance of legal obligations is one of the ICO’s and since codes of practice are not bound by the of potential can the law in to a The legal in which and statutory instruments are so that the courts will not be to the will of the an to and use which can be by the use of in and not given legal such instruments legal by requiring a or to take a compliance with the instrument into when considering compliance with a legal for example, can provide for but the constitutional These constitutional more when the is not as where legal obligations are or Even more difficult is the where instruments which the Despite the ICO’s stated to focus on protection the old Employment Practices Code was structured around practice is potentially that in addition to of reason for or to is that may be to on that the to it should in clear where it to particularly where to are to be or will be the and The ICO is required to with in the course of issuing codes of practice, and codes of are by trade associations – so both of provide potential for of practice The between obligation and should be made however, which is not the case in the existing ICO Employment Practices The of legal status is also is it to give legal to which the the instrument will legal or voluntary one is it will only with data protection Meanwhile, the ACAS codes of practice, the Employment Code of on the of of from the and and various other codes and guidance on trade will to upon aspects of data-driven employment the purpose of is to in its current form it the about the potential of a quasi-legislative were first in a by which a made in about the application of a provision of the Act as an of the of ‘quasi-legislation’ which was the and of a by of and and It seems have proven for example, an use of an automated to applicants with data trade is as under the and the processing of such data is under data protection Meanwhile, the it for employment and to or use a of trade or for such as employment or of An instrument which with one but the other will be Despite such obvious the new guidance on employer data practices is to even other areas of The ICO’s recent on AI and data for example, the risks of but itself to ‘guidance on the of data protection explicitly any discussion of the with law Employers and are to out how the ICO’s guidance on of data protection to the guidance on law to other instruments would be a the Employment Code, for example, employee protection legislation and relevant where An even better would be a instrument explaining how the various legal apply to given A recent report for the the of guidance a between the and the as as the for Data – a with in data and AI – and and statutory guidance by the ICO and EHRC was also proposed by the for the of Equality in its report on AI is a and in the ICO’s most recent Information Rights the for and The recently up to that is a – the the EHRC and ACAS are all from the It seems that a code on employer data practices, by all of the relevant would employers and workers better than a of codes by different is a clear need for clarity on the legal framework algorithmic management. first the ICO’s proposed Employment Practices Code might seem a instrument for such The and of the instrument will be however, by an of constitutional and on quasi-legislation. These have into a much in both employment and data has without adequate thought being given to its and as the data protection code employers are also to be of the ACAS codes of the code of practice on codes on trade and and on and a of codes of practice on health and safety – other The of and has that the only is legal while many codes of practice are by and into account’ by tribunals and some by codes of practice on some in data protection law have no status before It seems that such instruments are than their but there is no to that A similar can be when one at form and Some codes of practice are and while are longer and more The ACAS Code of on and only while the Equality and Human Rights Commission Employment Code of to The existing Employment Practices Code to while its will be an of Rather than with of the rise of algorithmic management should provide an opportunity for the ICO and policymakers to take a step back and reassess the on how historically discrete areas of law interact to a new phenomenon is The and of that guidance should be a for In the Commission that ‘the of on was that there was for a code of practice’, or at and that about the legal status of the various of It seems that a similar review of in data and employment would be more than of guidance. We from the under the and No
Source: Industrial Law Journal
Institution: University of Oxford
Language: English
Topic: Legal and Labor Studies
Subfield: Industrial relations
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,474
OpenAlex ID: W4295575383
