Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT Biased recommendations arise naturally in markets with heterogeneous consumers. We study a model in which a monopolist offers an experience good to a population of consumers with heterogeneous tastes and makes personalized purchase recommendations. We provide conditions under which a firm makes welfare‐reducing purchase recommendations with positive probability, resulting in inflated recommendations. We extend this insight to a setting in which an intermediary makes the recommendations, whereas a seller sets the retail price. Regulatory interventions that forbid inflated recommendations may lead to higher social welfare or may backfire.
Source: The RAND Journal of Economics
Authors: Martin Peitz, Anton Sobolev
Institutions: University of Mannheim, Centre for Economic Policy Research
Language: English
Subfield: Marketing
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,400
Funder: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Awards: G3023023833, G5060839972
OpenAlex ID: W4416676442
