Work

Pragmatic Interpretivism: How Interpretation Enables the Movement of Knowledge Across Science, Policy, and Practice

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: How can a finding be warranted within its originating inquiry while leaving open whether it should inform judgment in another context? This scholarship shows that interpretive mediation is epistemically necessary for warranted institutional judgment across different contexts. By developing Pragmatic Interpretivism through a theory-informed integrative conceptual analysis, this paper draws on pragmatist accounts of inquiry and illustrative scholarship on knowledge movement across science, policy, and practice. The analysis identifies contextual reconstruction, trust formation, legitimacy negotiation, and institutional intelligibility as interpretive functions whose epistemic significance depends on their contribution to assessing reasons for judgment. The core argument is that interpretive mediation connects a claim’s meaning, assumptions, evidential scope, and limitations to the question confronting its recipients: a necessity that concerns warranted reliance across contexts, rather than information transmission, institutional acceptance, or a separately observable interpretive activity. Interpretation may be embedded in professional expertise, procedures, and shared conventions; it can support, qualify, or reject a proposed use of knowledge. Interpretive mediation is connected to bounded epistemic completion; that is, inquiry includes a defined practical purpose, completion requires an adequately supported answer, and an assessable account of how its findings bear on the intended contextual judgment. Such completion remains revisable and does not require universal agreement or successful implementation, unless implementation evidence is necessary to answer the inquiry’s question. The contribution is a conceptual account distinguishing scientific warrant, contextual reliance, and practical outcomes, while explaining how interpretation enables purpose-defined inquiry to reach a defensible close. The account offers philosophical clarification rather than empirical proof or epistemic finality.
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7236396013
Cites: 90
Cited by:
Related to: 10